Reputational Cues in Repeated Trust Games by BOERO R et al.
The Journal of Socio-Economics 38 (2009) 871–877
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Journal of Socio-Economics
journa l homepage: www.e lsev ier .com/ locate /soceco
Reputational cues in repeated trust games
Riccardo Boero a, Giangiacomo Bravo b,∗, Marco Castellani c, Flaminio Squazzoni c
a Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Finanziarie “G. Prato”, Università di Torino and GECS - Research Group in Experimental and Computational Sociology, Italy
b Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Universita di Torino and GECS - Research Group in Experimental and Computational Sociology, Italy
c Dipartimento di Studi Sociali, Università di Brescia and GECS - Research Group in Experimental and Computational Sociology, Italy
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 17 September 2008
Received in revised form 21 April 2009
Accepted 3 May 2009
JEL classiﬁcation:
A14
C72
C92
Keywords:
a b s t r a c t
The importance of reputation in human societies is highlighted both by theoretical models and empirical
studies. In this paper, we have extended the scope of previous experimental studies based on trust games
by creating treatments where players can rate their opponents’ behavior and know their past ratings.
Our results showed that being rated by other players and letting this rating be known are factors that
increase cooperation levels even when rational reputational investment motives are ruled out. More
generally, subjects tended to respond to reputational opportunities even when this was neither rational
nor explainable by reciprocity.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Reputation
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. Introduction
Reputation is of paramount importance in creating and main-
aining prosocial behaviors in large human groups. Evidence of this
an be found both in theoretical models (e.g. Bravo and Tamburino,
008; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b; Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992;
aub and Weesie, 1990) and in empirical studies (see below).
rom an evolutionary perspective, the importance of building
nd maintaining good reputational standing is usually linked
ither to indirect reciprocity strategies (Boyd and Richerson, 1989;
eimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b, 2005;
anchanathan and Boyd, 2004) or with costly signaling motives
Gintis et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2006; Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997).
n both cases, reputation-based behavior tends to increase altru-
sm and cooperation in large groups of unrelated individuals where
ther mechanisms, such as kin selection or direct reciprocity, are
nlikely to succeed.
A wide range of empirical work highlights the key role of rep-
tation in inﬂuencing human behavior. In an experiment based on
owak and Sigmund (1998b) indirect reciprocity model, Seinen and
chram (2006) found that the simple possibility of knowing the
ast behavior of other individuals has a dramatic effect on cooper-
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 011 670 26 35 fax: +39 011 670 26 12.
E-mail address: giangiacomo.bravo@unito.it (G. Bravo).
053-5357/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
oi:10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.004ation. In their experiment, subjects interacted either in the position
of “donors” or of “recipients”. Each donor faced the decision of
whether to pay or not a cost b in order to provide a beneﬁt c > b
for a recipient.
The experiment showed that the donors’ decisions are strongly
inﬂuenced by the possibility of knowing the recipients’ past behav-
ior, with a helping rate of 70% when this was allowed versus 22%
when this was not possible. The authors explained the outcome as
an effect of the sensitivity of donors to the recipients’ “social sta-
tus” (i.e. reputation). A comparable effect of reputation has been
found also in experiments based on the ultimatum game (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003), on trust games (Keser, 2003), on various com-
binations of public good and indirect reciprocity games (Milinski et
al., 2002a,b, 2006) and on a combination of public good and trust
games (Barclay, 2004).
It is worth noting that reputation-based behavior does not nec-
essarily need to be grounded on the direct knowledge of past
behavior of other individuals, since humans can exploit the many
sources of information available in social life. For instance, gossip
plays an important role in transmitting reputational information
in human societies (see Dunbar, 1996). A recent study showed
that gossip has a strong inﬂuence on the behavior of experimen-
tal subjects even when they are also able to use other sources of
information, including direct observation (Sommerfeld et al., 2007).
Another experiment showed that individuals react to the
possibility of being the subject of gossip by increasing their
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ontributions in a dictator game (Piazza and Bering, 2008).
he relevance of direct observations and gossip for the sus-
ainability of cooperation in large social groups has been also
mphasized in simulation models (e.g. Conte and Paolucci,
002).
If reputation (via gossip or direct observation) plays such an
mportant role, it is likely that humans possessed a high sensitiv-
ty for anything that could lead to a change in their reputational
tatus. This sensitivity is probably an adaptation to the life of
unter-gatherer groups that represented the original adaptive
nvironment of our species, where the actions of each individ-
al were easily observable and deeply inﬂuenced the behavior
f the other group members and, more generally, cooperation
nside each group (Alexander, 1987; Barkow et al., 1992; Fehr
nd Fischbacher, 2003; Milinski and Rockenbach, 2007; Nowak
nd Sigmund, 2005; Richerson et al., 2003). Coherently with this
pproach, our general hypothesis is that human beings should react
o reputational opportunities even when this is barely rational
n terms of future expected utility. More speciﬁcally, it is neces-
ary to distinguish between a strategic reputation building (the
ne that clearly occurs in the experiments quoted above) and a
eeper and more cognitive response to situation where other peo-
le are in the condition to observe and judge one’s actions. While
he former, based on rational calculus, is undoubtedly important in
any situations, we argue that the latter is deeply rooted in social
nteraction mechanisms and produces non-trivial effects on human
ehavior.
The interplay of the two mechanisms is probably akin to that
bserved in a few studies where the mental processes of the
ubjects were monitored through functional magnetic resonance
maging. Especially interesting is a recent experiment realized
y Hsu et al. (2008) that shows the activation of different brain
egions when subjects face a difﬁcult trade-off between ratio-
al considerations based on efﬁciency motives and a widespread
ocial norm as equity. More speciﬁcally, the authors found that a
peciﬁc brain region (the putamen) responds to efﬁciency while
second one (the insula) responds to equity. A third region
the caudate/septal subgenual) encodes a uniﬁed measure of the
wo motives above and is probably linked with the resolution
f the trade-off. Moreover, a behavioral measure of individual
ifferences in inequity aversion correlates with the activity mea-
ured in the equity encoding regions. Following this example, we
an imagine similar psychological mechanisms acting on reputa-
ion and leading to rational reputation-building actions that are,
t least partially, separated from more social cognition driven
ehaviors.
Indeed, recent experimental work shows the existence of sub-
le reputation-related cues able to signiﬁcantly modify individuals’
ehavior. Those cues are especially linked with the possibility of
eing observed. For instance, in Haley and Fessler (2005) study,
he presence of stylized eyespots on the computer desktops used
or the experimental sessions signiﬁcantly increases the generos-
ty of players in a dictator game despite no differences in actual
nonymity. In another work, conducted in a real-world setting,
ateson et al. (2006) found a similar effect of apparently unim-
ortant cues of being watched. Their results show that people put
early three times as much money in a “honesty box”, used to col-
ect money for drinks in a university coffee room, when the cost of
he drinks was displayed on a board along with a picture of eyes
taring at the consumer than when the notice included a ﬂower
ontrol picture.The effect of being watched is so striking that subjects react also
hen it is evident that the “observer” is not human: the partic-
pants in another experiment contributed signiﬁcantly more to a
ublic good when a robot picture – that obviously represented a
achine but endowed with two large eyes – was placed on theirconomics 38 (2009) 871–877
computer desktops (Burnham and Hare, 2007). Overall, the results
of those experiments suggest the existence of a cognitive mecha-
nism that enhances cooperation in response to the (actually false)
possibility that somebody else is watching the subject’s actions,
and hence to the possibility of a modiﬁcation in their reputational
status.
Note that individuals not only care about their own reputational
status but also react promptly to other reputations. As before, in
some situations this may be explained by rational calculus, e.g.
when subjects face the decision of trusting another person whose
decisions can signiﬁcantly change their own payoffs. However, the
reaction can also be driven from different psychological mecha-
nisms. From this point of view, reputation is especially important
in trust situations. An elegant formalization of a trust situation
is the trust game (originally called investment game by Berg et
al., 1995). In a trust game, Player A decides how much of his/her
endowment to send (or “invest”) to Player B, who receives the
amount sent multiplied by a given factor greater than one (usu-
ally three). Subsequently, B decides the proportion of the received
amount to return to A. Since rationally B has no incentive to
return anything, the only rational strategy is also for A to keep
the entire endowment. Empirically, the amounts exchanged by real
subjects in a one shot game with no reputation possibilities are
usually higher than the amounts predicted by a rational choice per-
spective. This result is usually explained using direct reciprocity
motives (e.g. Berg et al., 1995; Fehr et al., 1998; McCabe and Smith,
2000).
Those experiments involved no reputational motives, but Keser
(2003) introduced both repetition and reputation in the trust game.
In her design, subjects interacted for a ﬁxed number of rounds and
A players where allowed to rate the behavior of their opponents.
In the next round, the ratings were presented to the new A players
before they took their decision. The main Keser’s result is that rep-
utation increases signiﬁcantly the overall cooperation levels of the
game.
It is worth noting that the introduction of the reputational
opportunity in the game has a stronger effect on the proportion
of the received amount returned by B players (+41.5% in the “short
run reputation” treatment in comparison with the baseline game)
than on the proportion of the endowment invested by the A ones
(+31.7%). In other words, the investment in reputation among B
players plays a stronger effect than the reduction of uncertainty
for the A ones.
Although there is little doubt that a rational investment in repu-
tation plays an important role in explaining Keser’s results, we could
suspect that it is not the whole story and that part of the enhance-
ment of B’s contributions is due to a different cognitive reaction to
a situation where the subject is “under judgment”. Unfortunately,
Keser’s experimental protocol does not permit us to separate the
two mechanisms. We therefore designed two experiments to dis-
entangle them by adding a treatment where also A players are under
judgment and by selectively remove all the rational opportunities
of reputational investment.
Our results were overall consistent with the predictions that a
signiﬁcant part of the subjects’ behavior is not explicable only as
rational investment in reputation. More speciﬁcally, besides the
obviously strong effect of rational reputation seeking, we found
that reputation matters also when the observed behavior can only
be based on cognitive mechanisms akin to the ones that become
apparent in the “eyespot” experiments. The effects of those mech-
anisms are less uniformly distributed among subjects, but are still
noticeable at the aggregate level. The paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 describes the ﬁrst experimental setting and presents its
results; Section 3 presents the setting and the results of the second
experiment; Section 4 is devoted to a general discussion of the two
experiments.
ocio-Economics 38 (2009) 871–877 873
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Table 1
Average investment and returns by treatment in the ﬁrst experiment. Standard devi-
ations are in parenthesis.
A investment (ECU) B return (ECU)
Baseline rounds (all groups) 3.91 3.88
(2.67) (4.46)
B-Rep 4.39 6.30
(2.84) (5.23)
A-Rep 5.61 5.28R. Boero et al. / The Journal of S
. Experiment 1
.1. Methods
One hundred and twenty subjects participated in the ﬁrst
xperiment in three groups of 40 individuals. Subjects were stu-
ents of the University of Brescia – 58 females and 62 males –
ecruited through public announcements within different facul-
ies. The experiment took place on a single day in the computer
aboratory of the Faculty of Economics, which is equipped with the
xperimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All interactions
ook place through the computer network and the subjects had no
ossibility of identifying their counterparts. The experiment used a
ithin-subject design: participants played a trust game for a total
f 35 rounds, with the ﬁrst 10 consisting of a baseline treatment,
ased on Berg et al. (1995) game, and the last 25 of a different treat-
ent for each group. The subjects were informed in advance of the
uration of the game (i.e. the number of periods) of each of the two
tages of the experiment. Each group played for about one hour
nd a half and the average earnings were 14.35 Euros that were
aid immediately after the experiment.
The experiment used a “stranger” matching protocol (i.e. ran-
om re-coupling in each period) and the players’ roles were
andomly assigned at the beginning of each period. The sequence of
he players’ moves during both the baseline (10 periods) and subse-
uent treatments (25 periods) was as follows: (i) both player A (the
rustor) and player B (the trustee) received an initial endowment
f 10 experimental currency units (ECU), with an exchange rate of
ECU = 1.5 Euro cents; (ii) player A decided his/her investment and
he invested amount was tripled and sent to player B in addition
o his/her own endowment; (iii) B chose the amount to return to
; (iv) the sums earned by both players in the current period were
isplayed to the subjects.
After the common baseline, each of the three groups of 40 sub-
ects played a different treatment. The sequence of players’ moves
n all treatments was as in the baseline except for the introduction
f a “rating” stage at the end of each period. In the ﬁrst treatment
hereafter indicated as B-Rep), the focus was on B reputation. This
as achieved by allowing A to rate B behavior as “negative”, “neu-
ral”, or “positive”. Note that, at the rating stage, A already knew the
um returned by B and that A had the possibility to rate B only when
is/her investment was greater than zero. The subsequent A players
nteracting with B were informed of the last rating received by the
atter before making their investment decision. When a B player had
ot already been rated, e.g. in the ﬁrst period of the treatment or
ecause he/she not yet played as B, an “unknown” rating appeared
n A decision screen.
The second treatment (hereafter A-Rep) was exactly like the ﬁrst
ne except for the fact that B was allowed to rate A. This informa-
ion was available in the next period for the subject playing as B
ith A players who were already rated. As in previous case, the
ating possibilities were “negative”, “neutral” and “positive” and
his information was presented to the B players before their return
ecision.
In the third treatment (hereafter Both-Rep), both A and B play-
rs were allowed to rate each other and knew this information in
he following period before their investment/return decision. The
ain purpose behind the design of this treatment was to inves-
igate whether the introduction of a two-way reputation system
ould lead to higher cooperation levels than the sum of the two
ne-way rating schemes..2. Experiment 1 results
Table 1 presents the overall results of the ﬁrst experiment.
ll analysis was conducted on the R 2.8.1 statistical platform (R(2.96) (5.96)
Both-Rep 5.42 7.25
(3.17) (6.46)
Development Core Team, 2008), using the plm 1.1-1 package for
panel models. In all our treatments, the baseline periods produced
results that were fully consistent with previous experiments based
on the standard repeated trust game (e.g. Berg et al., 1995; Ortmann
et al., 2000). This means that the overall experimental setting
of our baseline treatment (e.g., the spatial setting of the labora-
tory, the computer interface, and the actual values of the amounts
exchanged) was capable of reproducing the results of a standard
trust game and can hence fruitfully be compared with the further
treatments that we tested.
In order to investigate the effect of the introduction of a repu-
tation system in the game, taking at the same time into account
the panel structure of the data, we estimated a ﬁxed effects (or
“within-groups”) panel regression model for each treatment (see
Baltagi, 2001). This is a strategy similar to that used in Barrera and
Buskens (in press), although we used a ﬁxed effect model instead
of random effect one, which is more appropriate in case of in-group
comparisons.
Table 2 presents a summary of the coefﬁcients estimates for
the B-Rep treatment model. The treatment effect is signiﬁcant and
positive for both A investments and B returns, when controlling
for the amounts received by players in the previous rounds, for
end effects of both the baseline and the treatment periods, and,
in the case of B returns, for the amount invested by A in the cur-
rent round. The treatment effect for B returns is more pronounced
than the one for A investment, a fact that ﬁts with the idea that
being under rating enhances B willingness to return high amounts
to A.
It is worth noting that, while A investments are not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by any of the control variables included in the model,
many of them affect B returns. More speciﬁcally, Table 2 shows a
positive effect of an increase of A investment and a strong negative
effect of the last period of the treatment. The relation between A
investments and B returns is explicable in terms of reciprocity and
has been widely observed in trust games (e.g. Berg et al., 1995). The
end effect is however understandable by considering that any fur-
ther investment of reputation will be lost with the end of the game.
Overall, B actions appears to be more easily inﬂuenced by many
details of the game than the A ones (notice that the coefﬁcients
related to the past amounts received by the current B when he/she
played in both A and B positions are also signiﬁcant). The enhance-
ment in A investment compared with the baseline depends instead
only on the possibility of discriminating between trustworthy and
untrustworthy B. A new panel model (excluding the baseline peri-
ods) shows that A players actively discriminates among the B ones
depending on their rating (Table 3). A “positive” judgment leads to
a signiﬁcant higher investment relatively to the “unknown” case,
while a “negative” one to a signiﬁcant lower investment. On the
other hand, there is no signiﬁcant difference in investments when
B has a “neutral” judgment relative to the case where he/she has
not yet been rated. Overall, the results of the B-Rep treatment show
a strong effect of reputation on player’s action and are consistent
874 R. Boero et al. / The Journal of Socio-Economics 38 (2009) 871–877
Table 2
Coefﬁcient estimations for the B-Rep treatment model.
Dependent: A investment Dependent: B return
Treatment effect 0.740 (0.217)*** 2.141 (0.281)***
Previous return received when playing as A 0.013 (0.020) 0.071 (0.026)**
Previous investment received when playing as B 0.017 (0.037) 0.102 (0.043)*
Last treatment period −0.091 (0.539) −5.491 (0.687)***
Last baseline period −0.451 (0.557) −0.945 (0.706)
Current A investment – – 1.048 (0.043)***
F 3.855** 143.055***
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance codes:
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
Table 3
Coefﬁcient estimations for rating effects on A investments in B-Rep and Both-Rep treatments.
B-Rep treatment Both-Rep treatment
B negative rating −1.611 (0.333)*** −1.132 (0.356)**
B neutral rating 0.106 (0.343) 0.246 (0.394)
B positive rating 2.489 (0.329)*** 1.764 (0.356)***
Previous return received when playing as A 0.008 (0.018) 0.039 (0.017)*
Previous investment received when playing as B 0.028 (0.034) 0.037 (0.032)
Last treatment period −0.104 (0.423) −1.798 (0.471)***
F 66.423*** 35.334***
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance codes:
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ith the ones reported from the Keser (2003) experiment presented
bove.
Treatment A-Rep, where B was allowed to rate A behavior, pro-
uced an increase in the average investment compared to the
aseline periods and a decrease in the average return when con-
rolled for A investments (Table 4). B players are no longer under
ating and the increase in absolute terms of their returns is only due
o the large increase of A investments (they actually reduced their
eturns, when proportioned to the received amount). The amount
eceived in the last period when they played in the A role has a
eak but signiﬁcant effect for both A and B players, while none of
he other control variables had a signiﬁcant effect.
The large increase in A investments is hard to explain follow-
ng rational expectations. B players are not in a risk situation and
ossess the information regarding the actual amount received in
he current round. So why should they consider the rating of their
ounterparts? Nevertheless, statistical evidence shows that B play-
rs also used As’ past ratings in their decisions. In order to analyze
his point, we estimated a further ﬁxed effects model, where the
anel included only the treatment periods. The resulting model was
ighly signiﬁcant [F(7,492) = 48.002, p < 0.001] and had a negative
nd signiﬁcant effect for both a past negative and a past “neu-
ral” judgment compared with an unknown judgment (t = −2.079,
able 4
oefﬁcient estimations for the A-Rep treatment model.
Dependent: A inve
reatment effect 1.368
revious return received when playing as A 0.102
revious investment received when playing as B 0.039
ast treatment period −0.720
ast baseline period −0.510
urrent A investment –
28.854***
tandard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance codes: **p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.p = 0.038 and t = −0.705, p = 0.007, respectively), while the effect for
a “positive” judgment was not signiﬁcant (t = −1.5707, p = 0.116). As
expected, there is a positive and signiﬁcant effect for the amount
invested by A (t = 15.135, p < 0.001), and a positive effect for the
amount received in the last period when the current B played as
A (t = 2.235, p < 0.025), while the other control variables showed
non-signiﬁcant effects.
Treatment Both-Rep led to a signiﬁcant increase in both invest-
ments and returns in comparison with the baseline periods. Both
effects were however weaker than the corresponding ones in the
B-Rep and A-Rep treatments. There is a signiﬁcant end effect for
both A and B players, coherently with the prediction that the incen-
tive for investing in reputation during the last period of the game
should decrease, while only A players respond signiﬁcantly to an
increase in the amounts received in the previous period (Table 5).
The rating effects are similar to the ones registered in the B-Rep
treatment (Table 3).2.3. Discussion of experiment 1 results
The ﬁrst experiment showed that the amounts invested/
returned were systematically higher when subjects were under rat-
ing. This result is robust across treatments and independent from
stment Dependent: B return
(0.169)*** −1.226 (0.339)***
(0.014)*** 0.070 (0.031)*
(0.027) −0.030 (0.049)
(0.434) −0.581 (0.829)
(0.449) −0.840 (0.858)
– 1.035 (0.050)***
77.120***
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Table 5
Coefﬁcient estimations for the Both-Rep treatment model.
Dependent: A investment Dependent: B return
Treatment effect 0.979 (0.210)*** 1.679 (0.332)***
Previous return received when playing as A 0.053 (0.016)** 0.004 (0.026)
Previous investment received when playing as B 0.050 (0.030) 0.059 (0.045)
Last treatment period −2.140 (0.537)*** −2.409 (0.830)**
Last baseline period −0.242 (0.550) −1.174 (0.848)
Current A investment − – 1.215 (0.046)***
F 11.853*** 143.580 ***
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atandard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance codes: *p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
he position held by the subjects in the game. The B-Rep treatment
esults conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings of Keser (2003). The following
wo treatments extend her ﬁndings by showing that also A play-
rs are sensitive to the possibility of invest in their reputation and
hat the B ones responds to As’ reputation. The latter result is espe-
ially interesting, since in the A-Rep treatment B players are neither
n a risk position nor under rating and therefore have no rational
ncentives to modify their behavior on the bases of the judgments
eceived by A players.
The Both-Rep treatment conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the previous
nes, even if its effect on A an B behavior is somewhat weaker.
his suggest that a system implementing a bidirectional reputation
cheme does not perform necessarily better than one using only
ne-way ratings.
Overall, while most of the investment/return increase is prob-
bly motivated mainly by rational reputation-seeking behaviors,
here are some hints that also other cognitive mechanisms are at
ork. First, A players enjoy an actual beneﬁt from knowing B ratings,
ince this information can help to reduce uncertainty on B behav-
ors, but the opposite is not true. Therefore, at least for A players it
s difﬁcult to completely reduce the motivation behind this “rating
ffect” to a simple rational investment in reputation. The decision
or B players is actually analogous to that faced by subjects playing
dictator game, and the relative returns found in the baseline peri-
ds are indeed similar to the proportion of the endowment offered
y ﬁrst players in standard dictator games. It is well known that the
esults of dictator games are highly sensitive to many details of the
xperimental setting. However, most of the time this has little to do
ith rational reasoning and depends instead from the functioning
f other mental mechanisms (for a review of dictator experiments,
ee Camerer, 2003, 48–63).
Secondly, if both A and B players were only motivated by a
ational investment in reputation, they should increase their invest-
ent/return levels as soon as the reputational opportunity arises,
.e., from the ﬁrst period of the treatment following the base-
ine. Nevertheless, neither the returns in the ﬁrst period allowing
anking of the B-Rep treatment, nor the investments in the ﬁrst
eriod of the A-Rep treatment are signiﬁcantly different from those
n the opening period of the experiment [Wilcoxon signed rank
est: V = 13, p = 0.152 (two tailed) and V = 2.5, p = 0.424 (two tailed),
espectively]. From the second treatment round on, players start
nstead to increase their investments/returns when receiving bad
ankings: a behavior that leads to the overall higher cooperation
evel highlighted in Tables 2 and 4. This result suggests that subjects
o not rationally plan to invest in their own reputation: they react
nstead to the judgments they receive during the game in order to
aintain a sufﬁcient reputational status.Finally, it is worth noting that the “rating effect” apparently
rowds out even the effect of incertitude reduction for A players.
he amount invested by A players in the Both-Rep treatment is
ndeed very close to the amount invested in the A-Rep one (actu-
lly somewhat lower) where only B players were allowed to ratethe A ones (see Table 1). This implies that the difference in A invest-
ments between the baseline and the treatment periods in the B-Rep
treatment – due to the fact that A players could rationally trust the
B ones having a “positive” judgment – disappears in the Both-Rep
treatment. In the latter case, only the two-way effect of rating still
produces signiﬁcant effects on the observed behaviors, which are
similar to those found in the A-Rep treatment for A players and in
the B-Rep one for B players.
3. Experiment 2
3.1. Methods
We designed a second experiment to verify some of the hypothe-
ses arising from the ﬁrst one, with a speciﬁc focus on non-rational
investments in reputation. A total of 84 students, 34 females and
50 males, participated to the new experiment, with an average
earning of 12.88 Euros. We ran two new treatments with 42 stu-
dents each. The ﬁrst one (hereafter B-Rep-NR, where NR stands for
“non-rational”) was a modiﬁcation of the B-Rep treatment, while
the second one (A-Rep-NR) was a modiﬁcation of the A-Rep treat-
ment. In order to keep the situation as simple as possible, the second
experiment used a between-subject design, which implies that no
baseline period was played. This meant that in order to understand
the treatment effect, we compared the subjects under rating (i.e. B
players in the B-Rep-NR treatment and A players in the A-Rep-NR
one) with those that, playing in the corresponding role in the other
treatment, were not under rating (i.e. B players in the A-Rep-NR
treatment and A players in the B-Rep-NR one).
Besides the fact that subjects did not play the baseline periods,
A-Rep-NR and B-Rep-NR treatments were exactly like the corre-
sponding ones of the ﬁrst experiment, except that the players
were able to know their opponents’ rating only after they took the
decision regarding the amount to invest or to return. This change
was designed with the explicit purpose of eliminating any rational
incentive for reputation investment. The fact that the ratings were
revealed to the subjects only after they took the decision about the
amount to invest/return implies that the rating had no possibil-
ity of inﬂuencing their decisions and, consequently, that no player
could rationally increase his/her future earnings by investing in rep-
utation. Despite the lack of rational incentives, we still expect that
subjects should react to the fact of being under rating because of
the working of different cognitive mechanisms. The ﬁndings of the
ﬁrst experiment suggested that especially B players, who appeared
to be more sensitive to the details of the game, should signiﬁcantly
improve their returns in the B-Rep-NR treatment comparing to the
A-Rep-NR one.3.2. Experiment 2 results
Table 6 presents experiment 2 average investments and
returns. It is immediately clear that the differences between
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Table 6
Average investment and returns by treatment in the second experiment. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis.
A investment (ECU) B return (ECU)
B-Rep-NR 4.30 4.60
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S(3.20) (5.61)
-Rep-NR 4.47 3.28
(3.16) (4.83)
he two treatments inﬂuence much more B returns than A
nvestments.
In order to determine the signiﬁcance of this effect, we estimated
random effects panel model (Baltagi, 2001; for an application
f random effect models to the analysis of experimental data, see
arrera and Buskens, in press), which included a dummy variable
ndicating the treatment and all the control variables used in the
rst experiment. The coefﬁcient estimates are reported in Table 7.
s expected, there is a positive and signiﬁcant effect on B returns
or the B-Rep-NR dummy, controlling for A investments, which
mplies that B players returned signiﬁcantly more when under
ating. Also the sign of the coefﬁcient for A players’ investments
oes in the expected direction, but the coefﬁcient itself is not
igniﬁcant. Both A and B players are also signiﬁcantly affected by
he amount received in the last period when they played as A, but
here was no signiﬁcant end effect.
An interesting result is that, despite the fact that the ratings have
o practical effect, the subjects playing in both B position in the B-
ep-NR treatment and A position in the A-Rep-NR treatment tend to
ncrease their returns after receiving a “negative” judgment while
hey tend to decrease their returns when receiving a “neutral” or
positive” judgment (Table 8).
.3. Discussion of experiment 2 results
The results of the second experiment reinforced the idea of a
peciﬁc cognitive reputational mechanism. The average amounts
eturned by subjects are signiﬁcantly higher when under rating.
lso the amounts invested by A players tended to increase, even if
his effect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Unlike the previous exper-
ment, this result can no longer be explained under a rational
eputation investment framework, since the experiment design did
ot allow the future opponents of a given player to know his/her
eputation before their investment/return decisions. The fact that a
on-rational mechanism is now at work is also highlighted by the
ack of any end effect.
Especially interesting is the fact that both A and B players reacted
trongly to the judgments received. This suggests a reputation
ffect also on A behaviors, despite the non-signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst
oefﬁcient of the panel model. The result that, on average, A invest-
ents did not signiﬁcantly increase in the A-Rep-NR treatment
ay indeed be due to the higher tolerance of B players, who less
requently than the A ones rated their opponents’ behavior as “neg-
able 7
oefﬁcient estimations for the A-Rep-NR vs. B-Rep-NR comparison model.
Dependent: A inve
-Rep-NR treatment effect −0.330
revious return received when playing as A 0.111
revious investment received when playing as B 0.015
ast treatment period −0.264
urrent A investment −
18.044***
tandard errors are in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance codes: **p < 0.01.
* p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.001.conomics 38 (2009) 871–877
ative” (Table 8). This may have created less incentives for A players
than for the B ones to change their behavior, resulting in lower
overall cooperation levels than in the B-Rep-NR treatment.
4. General discussion
Our experiments show that humans are highly sensitive to their
own reputational status and react promptly to other people’s judg-
ment. A large part of this effect is undoubtedly due to a rational
investment in reputation, but the second experiment suggests that
reputation-seeking behavior still matters even when any practi-
cal effect of the players’ judgments is ruled out. The non-rational
reputation effect appears to be weaker than the rational one, but
the two mechanisms are probably not mutually exclusive, work-
ing instead often side by side. In the ﬁrst experiment, the increase
of the amounts invested/returned is hence due to both the ratio-
nal reputation building behavior and the cognitive response to the
rating scheme. Only the latter mechanism is at work in the second
experiment, a fact that explains the weaker reputation effect.
A related point is the signiﬁcant end effect found in the ﬁrst
experiment, but not in the second one (Tables 5 and 7). This is con-
sistent with the idea of a rational investment in reputation working
in the former case, while a different mechanism is at work when
judgments cannot inﬂuence opponents’ behavior.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the effects of the cogni-
tive reputation mechanism are less uniformly distributed among
subjects than rational reputation building. This is shown by the
variance of B players’ returns in the B-Rep-NR treatment, which
is signiﬁcantly (at the 10% level) higher than the one in the B-Rep
treatment [F(499,524) = 0.868, p = 0.055 (one tailed)]. Similarly, the
variance of A players’ investments in the A-Rep-NR treatment is
higher than the one in the A-Rep treatment [F(499,524) = 0.879,
p = 0.072 (one tailed)]. This opens an interesting analogy with the
Hsu et al. (2008) ﬁndings showing that the inequity aversion varies
signiﬁcantly among individuals, both as behavioral measure and as
activity of the related brain regions. Unfortunately, we were not able
to perform brain imaging on our subjects, but in our experiments
the behavior of subjects also appears to be less uniform when only
cognitive reputation mechanisms are at work (experiment 2) than
when they also rationally invest in their reputation (experiment 1).
Summarizing, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
reputation motives signiﬁcantly modiﬁes human behavior towards
greater cooperation not only when rational incentives in reputa-
tion building exist, but also when the judgments expressed have
no practical consequences. From an evolutionary point of view,
the sensitivity towards reputational status is probably part of the
human “tribal social instinct”, i.e. the set of emotions and cognitive
mechanisms that represent one of the key adaptations for social life
of our species (Richerson and Boyd, 2001; Richerson et al., 2003).
The strong concern for reputational status, even when it has no
actual effect on individuals’ payoffs, is a cognitive mechanism that
can signiﬁcantly explain a part of human behavior and has both
evolutionary meaning and empirical plausibility.
stment Dependent: B return
(0.331) 1.411 (0.702)*
(0.014)*** 0.042 (0.020)*
(0.024) 0.027 (0.033)
(0.342) −0.938 (0.530)
– 0.765 (0.033)***
110.183***
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Table 8
A investment and B return change by received rating in the second experiment.
Rating proportion A investment change (ECU) Rating proportion B return change (ECU)
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Gegative 0.389 0.511
eutral 0.228 −0.209
ositive 0.383 −0.816
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